Trump’s $12B rare earth plan targets China as experts warn US is ‘one crisis away’


Industry leaders are sounding the alarm about something most Americans rarely think about: rare earth elements and critical minerals. These materials power everything from fighter jets and missile systems to smartphones and electric vehicles. And right now, the United States is overwhelmingly dependent on foreign suppliers especially China.

That’s not a small issue. It’s a national security risk.

As of 2024, the U.S. is at least 93% import-dependent on rare earth elements and graphite. When you consider how essential these materials are to defense systems, advanced electronics, and modern manufacturing, it becomes clear that we’re walking a tightrope. Several industry experts have warned that we’re essentially “one crisis away” from losing access if China decides to restrict exports.

And that’s not a hypothetical concern. According to executives at Graphite One, China has already shown a willingness to weaponize access to key materials like gallium and uranium. They can turn the tap off, apply pressure, then restore supply on their terms. That’s not a stable foundation for a country that wants to remain economically and militarily independent.

President Trump’s proposed $12 billion “Project Vault” is designed to address that vulnerability. Backed by $1.67 billion in private investment and a $10 billion loan from the Export-Import Bank, the plan would create a federally supported stockpile of rare earths and other critical minerals. The idea is similar to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve created after the 1970s oil crisis but adapted for the 21st century.

The logic is straightforward. If energy security justified a petroleum reserve, then supply chain security justifies a critical mineral reserve. These materials now play the same role oil once did: they are foundational to economic strength and national defense.

Graphite One’s Graphite Creek site in Alaska highlights what’s possible domestically. It’s the largest known graphite resource in the United States. Alaska alone reportedly contains known resources of 58 of the 60 critical minerals on the federal list. Yet instead of fully developing these assets, we’ve allowed ourselves to rely heavily on foreign sources including adversarial governments.

There’s also a counterterrorism angle that often gets overlooked. Some mineral deposits in parts of Africa, including Mozambique, are located in areas where ISIS-linked groups have operated. Strengthening domestic production doesn’t just reduce Chinese leverage; it can also limit the flow of money into unstable regions controlled by hostile actors.

Critics in China have dismissed Project Vault as merely a short-term buffer rather than a long-term solution. Maybe that’s true in part a stockpile alone isn’t enough. But it’s a start. During the Cold War, the U.S. restricted exports of dual-use technologies because they could serve both civilian and military purposes. Today, critical minerals are part of that same strategic equation. We’re not just talking about trade; we’re talking about leverage.

Some analysts have also pointed to the Arctic and Greenland as part of the broader picture. When you look at a map from the top down instead of the traditional flat projection, the Arctic becomes a central strategic region. The U.S. is an Arctic nation because of Alaska. Greenland’s resource potential is significant. If China or Russia deepen their economic footprint there and lock in mineral supply chains, that becomes a strategic concern whether we like it or not.

At the end of the day, this debate isn’t about protectionism. It’s about resilience. A country that cannot secure the raw materials essential to its defense and economy is not truly sovereign. Free markets work best when they aren’t distorted by authoritarian regimes using state power to manipulate supply chains.

Project Vault may not solve every supply chain problem overnight, but it reflects a broader recognition that national security and economic security are inseparable. In a world where adversaries are willing to use trade as a weapon, pretending that supply chains are apolitical is no longer realistic.

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